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1. The New Industrial Organization
It is generally accepted that the modern field of industrial organization
began with the work of Edward Mason and others at Harvard in the 1930's.
Lacking faith in the ability of available price theory to-explain important
aspects of industrial behavior, Mason called for detailed case studies of a
wide variety of industries. It was hoped that relatively simple generalizations
useful for antitrust policy, among other applications, would emerge from a
sufficient number of careful studies. Perhaps because such generalizations
were not actually uncovered very rapidly by case analysis, or perhaps because
of easier access to data and computers, the case study approach was generally
abandoned by the early 1960's. Most students of industrial organization followed
Joe Bain (1951, 1956) and turned instead to cross-section studies, electing "to
treat much of the rich detail as random noise, and to evaluate hypotheses by
-2
statistical tests of an inter-firm or inter-industry nature." The need to
describe each firm or industry in the sample by a small number of more or less
readily available measures effectively limited consideration to relatively
simple hypotheses not involving "the rich detail" so important to students of
particular industries. Thus the standard regression equation in this literature
specified some measure of profitability as a linear function of a concentration
ratio and, usually, other similar variables. Bain's (1968) major text similarly
focused on simply-stated qualitative generalizations and contained almost no
formal microeconomic theory.
Leonard Weiss' (1971) impressive survey of "Quantitative Studies of
Industrial Organization," prepared for the Econometric Society a decade ago,
concentrated almost exclusively on cross-section econometric research. Com-
menting approvingly on that survey, William Comano (1971, pp. 403-4) provided
*a crisp description of industrial organization circa 1970:
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Despite the original prescription of Edward Mason, practitioners
in this area have moved from an early reliance on case studies
and toward the use of econometric methods of analysis. To a
large extent, therefore, a review of econometric studies of
industrial organization is a review of much of the content of
the field.
Recognizing that methods of scientific inquiry inevitably change, Weiss (1971,
p. 398) opined at the end of his survey that "[p]erhaps the right next step is
back to the industry study, but this time with'regression in hand."
Some econometric work on individual industries had of course been done when
Weiss wrote; MacAvoy's (1962, 1965) studies of natural gas price formation and
nineteenth century railroad cartels are particularly noteworthy. A great deal
more of this sort of analysis was done during the 1970's, however. The inves-
tigations of insurance markets by Joskow (1973) and Smallwood (1975) and of
airline regulation by Douglas and Miller (1975) are good examples. In contrast
to the earlier cross-section work and even to some of the still earlier case
studies, the industry-specific econometric analyses of the 1970's seem to have
been more concerned with understanding the particular industry at hand than with
developing or testing simple propositions that might apply to all markets. This
may have reflected a shift in scientific interest toward the fine structure of
markets. In the U.S. at least, it likely also reflected a rise in the importance
of industry-specific regulation relative to antitrust policy. All the industries
mentioned above were regulated in the U.S. Regulation can at least in principle
respond to an industry's idiosyncratic features in a way that is difficult for
antitrust policy, which must ultimately be based on relatively simply-stated
rules that apply to all markets.
Not only were scholars pulled toward industry-specific analysis, they
were pushed away from cross-section regressions. After Weiss (1971) wrote,
critics such as Demsetz (1973), Mancke (1974), and Phillips (1976) began to
..,
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demonstrate the extreme difficulty of drawing firm conclusions about
causation from the sorts of cross-section regressions that began filling
the journals in the 1960's. Those regressions now seem much less central to
the field of industrial organization than they were a decade ago.
Along with a shift in the focus of econometric analyses away from cross
sections and toward particular industries has come an important change in the
role and status of formal theory in industrial organization. The first,
Masonian wave of case studies were explicitly part of an inductive enter-
prise distrustful of received theory. One also finds very little explicit
theorizing in the cross-section literature; a priori arguments are typically
limited to verbal justifications for the inclusion or exclusion of particular
variables on the right-hand side of a single linear equation. In the 1960's,
however, students in good graduate programs were learning that one had to
have a formal structural model, not just a list of plausible candidate
independent variables, in order to do serious econometrics. Thus the
empirical essays of Joskow (1973) and Smallwood (1975) mentioned above
contain more explicit development and use of theory than most of the early,
classic, book-length industry studies, and they are not atypical in this
regard.
The tools of theoretical analysis available to well-trained economists
today are much more powerful than those Mason and his contemporaries had.
In recent years, these tools have been employed with increasing frequency
to construct formal models that either attempt to do justice to "the rich
detail" of particular industries or promise to be helpful in the analysis
of classes of real markets. Indeed, a sizeable literature has lately grown
up in what can only be called "the pure theory of industrial organization";
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theory that is designed to help one analyze individual real markets
correctly but that is not tied to or based upon any particular set of facts.
To paraphrase Weiss, the rallying cry of many of those working in industrial
organization in the 1970's seems to have been "back to the industry, but this
time with the tools of modern economic theory in hand." Michael Spence has
recently provided a revealing description of this approach:
My instinct as an economist is to study industries on a
case by case basis, applying and adapting models as appro-
priate. For those of us who do this kind of work, the
differences among industries may seem more important or
interesting than the similarities. And thus we are un-
comfortable with general rules.
This new industrial organization of the 1970's differs from that of both
classical industry-studiers and cross-section regression-runners in a number of
respects. First, though the focus is on understanding the particular, formal
theory is used intensively, and its power is appreciated. If nothing else,
formai modeling serves as a check on the tendency of verbal argument to make
any imaginable form of conduct sound plausible in small numbers situations,
the same sort of check provided by close examination of actual conduct. Both
checks are easily by-passed in the cross-section econometric approach. Second,
in "applying and adapting models as appropriate," the investigator goes beyond
mechanical use of textbook polar case analysis of competition and monopoly.
Just as industrial organization economists began to become econometricians
in the 1960's, many began to become theorists in the 1970's. Third, the
systematic search for simple generalizations of the sort that Mason hoped to
find in case studies, the same sort that cross-section regressions seek, is
essentially abandoned. This is not inconsistent with the emphasis on develop-
ment of tractable, and thus simple, formal models, since these are taken to
be tools useful for understanding "the rich detail" of reality. In any case,
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Spence's comments make it clear that faith in the adequacy of simple
general rules for either market analysis or public policy is no longer
universal.
Much of the interesting theoretical work in industrial organization
deals with markets in which the offerings of rival sellers are essentially
identical and buyers are very well informed. Considerable attention is
paid to oligopolistic interaction and to the strategic use by established
sellers of first-mover advantages and economies of scale to protect monopoly
profits from outside entry. Studies by Spence (1977, 1979), Dixit (1979,
1980) and others go beyond the familiar criticisms of the Bain-Sylos limit-
pricing model, which was developed in the 1950's, to the construction of
more satisfactory models of entry deterrence in which all actors behave
rationally.5
In many real-world markets, however, buyers do not perceive all
sellers' products as identical, and not all buyers are well informed.
Markets with product differentiation and non-price competition were forcibly
brought to economists' attention by Chamberlin (1933); they were not considered
explicitly in the Marshallian price theory he inherited. Formal analysis of
the consequences of imperfect buyer information about price seems to have
begun with Stigler's (1961) seminal work. For many products, however,
especially those sold in supermarkets and similar multi-brand outlets,
information about quality is at least equally important and much less perfect.
In markets where products may differ and buyers may be unsure of the exact
differences among them, a central element of seller conduct is product
selection. Markets of this sort are more visible and important in modern
economies -- with cheap transportation, mass communication, and routine
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commercial application of the scientific method -- than in the economies
about which Adam Smith and Alfred Marshall wrote. They are thus referred
to as "modern markets" here.
The remainder of this essay considers problems that must be faced in
the economic analysis of modern markets and the development of analyti-
cal tools to cope with those problems. I do not attempt to be comprehensive
but rather focus on three sets of issues that seem to me both interesting and
important. Section 2 is concerned with two of Bain's (1968) three key dimensions
of market structure: concentration and product differentiation. The form of
product differentiation is shown to have important implications for the
appropriate measurement of concentration. Standard measures, which implicitly
assume product homogeneity, can easily lead one to incorrect inferences about
the nature of market interaction. A new measure of concentration that deals
with these problems is presented.
Section 3 deals with Bain's (1968) third key dimension, conditions of
entry. We focus on what he (1956, p. 216) found to be "the most importnat
barrier to entry discovered by detailed study": product differentiation
advantages of established sellers. Some suggestive evidence on the nature of
those advantages is discussed. A simple model of rational buyer behavior under
imperfect quality information is sketched in which differentiation advantages
arise naturally. Implications for patterns of competition are discussed.
Finally, advertising is important in many modern markets, and buyer
behavior therein involves problem-solving in important respects. Section 4
concludes this essay with a few general remarks about the treatment of
advertising and consumer behavior in industrial organization..
- . lI
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2. Market Concentration and Product Differentiation
Concentration is surely the most frequently quantified element of
market structure. With no product differentiation, received doctrine holds
that seller behavior will be more monopoly-like, at least in the short run
before entry can occur, the fewer the sellers or the less equal their market
6
shares. In markets with homogeneous products, it is thus sensible to define
and measure "concentration" by means of some function that is decreasing in
the number of sellers and increasing in some measure of the inequality of
7
their shares. If concentration is to be used as a predictor of market
conduct or performance, one would like to derive the exact form of this
function from a generally accepted theory of oligopoly, but no such theory
8
exists.
Two derivations of concentration indices from models of market behavior
nonetheless deserve mention. Following Rader(1972, pp. 269-73), let us
9
consider Cournot equilibrium with constant costs. Let ci be the unit cost
of firm i, with i = 1, ..., N, let qi be firm i's output, let Q be the sum
of the qi, and let P(Q) be the market inverse demand curve. Profits are
then given by
i= [P(Q) - cIq i 1, ..., N (2.1)
At Cournot equilibrium, firm i sets ari/aqi = 0 assuming all other outputs
fixed. If E is the absolute value of market demand elasticity, and si qi/Q
is firm i's market share, these equilibrium conditions can be written as
i =- 1, ..., N. (2.2)(P - ci)/P = i/E$
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Letting be total industry profit, the sum of the 71i one can multiply
both sides of (2.2) by qi/Q and sum over i to obtain
f/PQ H/E (2.3)
where the H index of concentration is defined by
( 2 (2.4)H = Z (si) . (.4)
i=l
Proceeding in a very different fashion, Stigler (1964) derives this same index
as a measure of the likelihood of collusive behavior in a market with imperfect
seller information. In markets with no product differentiation, the H index
thus seems a sensible measure of concentration. I have elsewhere [Schmalensee
(1977a)] attempted to show that it can be well approximated using published
official data on concentration ratios.
In the Cournot model above, an increase in any one firm's output affects
all other firms by reducing the market price. All are affected in proportion
to their market shares. With product differentiation, however, this kind of
symmetric or generalized interaction need not be present. If it is not, the
theoretical rationale for market-wide concentration measures like (2.4) is
weakened, as the development below establishes.
Markets with differentiated products began to receive serious attention
from theorists in the 1920's. Two polar case models of market demand and
seller interaction emerged at the very start of this work. The spatial
model of Hotelling (1929) stressed buyer diversity; additional brands made
it more likely that any individual buyer would find one well-suited to his
.particular tastes. The symmetric model usually associated with Chamberlin
(1933), on the other hand, involved a representative buyer who benefits from
increased product variety. Both polar cases are still used extensively;
III
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compare the spatial analyses of Salop (1979a) and Schmalensee (1978b)
with the symmetric models of Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
In the original Hotelling model, brands (of cider in his example) are
located along a line in the space of potential products. Buyers' ideal
products are spread out along this same line. Each brand competes only
with its two nearest neighbors, no matter how long the line is or how many
brands it holds. (End brands have only one nearest neighbor.) Because
rivalry is thus localized, each firm faces only a small number of actual
rivals, no matter what standard market-wide concentration measures imply.
Oligopolistic behavior would be predicted in markets of this sort even with
many sellers.
In the 1930's, Kaldor (1934, 1935) argued strongly for the spatial
view of differentiated markets, and he recognized that it implied a world
of overlapping oligopolies. By the early 1950's, Chamberlin (1951, 1953)
himself accepted the spatial model as the more useful of the two polar cases.
He (1951, p. 68) also clearly recognized that it implied ubiquitous oligopoly,
not the large-numbers case with which he is usually associated.
There is no reason to suppose that either extreme model is universally
appropriate. One might model the automobile market in spatial terms, for
instance, while analyzing the restaurant market in some locality with a
symmetric model. In some markets, interactions among rival sellers might
have more structure than the symmetric model implies but less than in a one-
dimensional Hotelling framework. Lancaster's (1966, 1971) model of demand,
where a linear technology converts purchases of goods into consumptions of
characteristics about which buyers care, might be able to shed light on
these intermediate cases, but so far very little has been done in this
_I_ _ I^IIX.IIX-·I)I·-l -I1I_ ·- 1..1- 1-.-i.----1-^IX-----.----·-..- -I____ ..^ -_I..IIX--_---llllll1--_-111111_1_1.11 _. _
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direction. As the analyses of Baumol (1967), Lancaster (1975), and Salop
(1979a) have shown, the formal correspondence between Lancastrian models with
two characteristics and one-dimensional spatial models is almost exact. In
particular, the same localization of competition is preserved. Archibald and
Rosenbluth (1975) have further shown that localization is preserved in models
with three characteristics. In Lancastrian models with four or more
characteristics, however, they demonstrate that in principle the average brand
might have a large number of direct competitors. Conditions that would either
guarantee or rule out this possibility are apparently not known, and no work
within the Lancastrian framework has apparently sought useful summary
statistics to describe intermediate degrees of localization.
The marketing literature contains both symmetric and spatial models, though
the latter usually involve more than one dimension. A good deal of econometric
11
work in marketing adopts the symmetric "us/us+them" specification. On the
other hand, the construction of "perceptual maps" of brands' locations in
product space, based on various sorts of questionnaire data, has become common-
12
place. These maps are somewhat hard to interpret in economic terms, however,
since the meaning of distance is rarely clear. Attempts have also been made
to capture the structure of brand interactions by analysis'of brand switching
data and, recently, by the estimation of nested multinomial logic models based
on forced-choice experimental data. 3 These structured approaches are
designed to provide insight to those concerned with marketing actual existing
brands or seeking profitable niches for new brands. They seem less helpful
to an analyst concerned with the general nature of seller interaction in the
market as a whole.
I now want to develop a measure of the overall extent to which rivalry
III
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14is localized in a particular market. This measure is in turn based on a
measure of concentration that reflects the structure of brands' interactions.
My approach is modeled on that leading to equation (2.3) above, except that
it is both easier and at least arguably more natural in the context of
differentiated products to work with non-price competition.
Thus suppose that the difference between price and unit cost is a constant,
m, for all firms, and assume that total market sales are fixed at Q. Let a.
be firm i's effective advertising, with ci the unit cost of that advertising.
(Per dollar spent, high quality brands may have more effective advertising.)
If the si are market shares, as above, profits can be written as follows:
i mQSi - Ciai, i = 1, ..., N. (2.6)
In Nash/Cournot noncooperative equilibrium, with each firm maximizing its own
profit taking the others' a's as fixed, it is easy to see that the ratio of
actual profit to potential monopoly profit is given by
N
]/mQ = 1 - ai( si/ aai). (2.7)
i=l
The most natural symmetric demand model in this framework is the following:
N
i ai/ Z a. i 1,.. N. (2.8)j=l J
Straightforward differentiation yields
N
asi/Da i = (1 - si)/ Z a, i 1, ..., N. (2.9)
j=l
I_)__in___CIYnP__^I__I____ 
___________
- 12 -
Substitution into (2.7) then gives us
N
H/mQ = 1 - si( 1-si ) = H.
i=l
(2.10)
The H index thus emerges as a sensible concentration measure in differentiated
markets in which competition is not localized at all. Note that (2.8) implies
N
sj/a i = - s/ i ak'J i k=l
That is, rivals are
market shares, just
also that if the c.
1/N.
iij; i, j=l, ... , N.
(2.11)
affected by any brand's actions in proportion to their own
as in the homogeneous product Cournot model above. Note
are nearly equal, so are the si, and H is then approximately
Now consider a spatial setup in which N brands are distributed evenly
around a circle with unit circumference, and buyers are distributed uniformly
around the same circle. Suppose that brands are numbered consecutively and
that each brand competes only with its two nearest neighbors. A tractable
demand structure with this property involves the following share equation:
si = 3ai/N(ai_l +ai+ai+l) ' i = 2, ..., N-,
with the obvious modification for brands 1 and N.16 If all the a. are equal,
this structure implies that all brands have shares of 1/N, exactly as in the
fully symmetric model, (2.8). Differentiation yields immediately
a i (s a i ) = (a ai ) / (a ai +al)
. i i_1 -411 i- 1 i i"
i = 2, ..., N-1. (2.13)
(2.12)
=si [1 -(Nsi/3)],
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Since the first and last expressions are equal for i=l and i=N as well,
direct substitution into (2.7) produces
N
]/mQ = 1- Z si[l - (Nsi/3)] = (N/3)H. (2.14)
i=l
If costs are roughly equal, the ratio of actual to maximum profit is on the
order of 1/3, no matter how large N is. One can thus think of (N/3) as
measuring the extent of localization, or of (3/N) as measuring the extent
to which rivalry among the brands in this market is generalized.
In any real market, the investigator is likely to have very incomplete
information about the structure of firms' demands. Given high quality estimates
of the demand structure, of course, equation (2.7) can be used directly to make
predictions about conduct and performance. Unless one has a great deal of
confidence in the second-order, curvature properties of these estimates,
however, this is likely to be a risky undertaking. Suppose, for instance,
that one admits the possibility of shares being determined by a simple
generalization of (2.8):17
N
s= (a.)e/ (a.)e, 0 < e < 1, i=l, ..., N.
i=(
(2.8')
This is clearly a symmetric model, but (2.10) must now be replaced by
N
I/mQ 1 - Z esi(l-si) = (l-e) + eH. (2.10')
i=l
The concentration measure developed below avoids dependence on difficult-to-
obtain second-order information, like the value of e, by essentially building in
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curvature assumptions like those used to derive (2.10) and (2.14).
It is crucial, however, to have first-order information on the relative
values of demand cross-derivatives. It is convenient to deal with that
information in the following form:
ij - (asj/ai)/(as/a i) = kijsj/(l-si), ij, i, j=l, ..., N.
(2.15)
The first equality defines the 0ij; the second defines the kij... It is
reasonable to assume that all these quantities are non-negative. Because
market share must sum to one,
0i1, or k..s. = (1-s), i = 1, ..., N.
ji i3 j
(2.16)
The O.. indicate at whose expense firm i can increase its sales. One can have
a good idea of who loses how much if i gains share, without having any information
18
about how rapidly the marginal product of i's advertising is falling off. In
the basic symmetric model, (2.8), all the kij are equal to unity. When demand
has more structure, as in (2.12), they differ in value. All else equal, one
would like a concentration measure that increased in response to this sort of
departure from symmetry.
I now proceed to construct such a measure. The summation in (2.10) is
a share-weighted average of the shares of the total market held by each firm's
rivals. Similarly, in (2.14) if the si are approximately 1/N, the summation
gives the share-weighted average of quantities approximately equal to 2/3,
the share of each firm's two rivals in the part of the market for which that
III
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firm is competing. The larger any firm is relative to its direct competitors
in either case, the smaller is the corresponding term in the summation, and the
larger is the ultimate concentration measure. This makes sense, both in terms
of the diminishing returns built into (2.8) and (2.12) and in terms of more
general notions of oligopoly interaction.
Suppose one thinks of (ij/sj) for ji as a sort of estimate of the
reciprocal of the share of the total market held by i's rivals. These estimates
are exact if (2.8) holds for all ji, but in general, they will differ. In
order to obtain a single number for each i, let us weight these.estimates
by the Oij, as these weights reflect the relative importance of the corresponding
rival firms to firm i. This yields
(1 - si) = 1/ e i/s.. (2.17)j~i ij3 
On the reasoning above, the relevant quantity is not the share of the
total market held by i's rivals, but their share of that part of the sub-market
for which i competes. One can estimate this latter share simply as follows:
(1- si)* = (1 - si)l[s i + (1 - si)]. (2.18)
Proceeding by analogy with (2.10) and (2.14), our measure of concentration
becomes
N N
H* 1 - Z si(1 - s i)* = (S Gi (2.19)
i=l i=l
where substitution from (2.15) - (2.18) establishes
_ __ _XI__*___^I_·__·__·_II _iljl·_____ilr___(i-.i 
IW1I-( ·IXI-V-*)-nC·*i--YLIIX;·-)_YYli 
i-_l-.__-l__.l ...__I^__...
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Gi Si + (-si)/ Z (k) i 1, ..., N. (2.20)
It is straightforward to show that any single Gi is maximized subject
to (2.16) and the non-negativity of the k.. if k = i for all i and j.
In this fully symmetric case, G = 1 and H* = H, as one would hope. Since
the summation in (2.20) is convex in the ki., H* increases with deviations
from this symmnetric situation in much the same way that H increases with
deviations from market share equality. It is clear that Gi > s. for all
i, so that H* has natural bounds:
H < H* < 1, (2.20)
with the left inequality strict except in the symmetric case. These
bounds induce limits on G*, the natural measure of the extent to which
rivalry is generalized among competing brands:
0 < G* H/H* _< 1. (2.21)
Except in symmetric models like (2.8) or (2.8'), G* is less than unity.
In the spatial model (2.12) with equal costs, it is straightforward to show
that H* = 1/3 and G* = 3/N, as above. One can think of 1/G* as a measure
of the extent of localization of rivalry.
I do not claim that H* and G* are the only measures of their general
type or the best ones; they are merely the only such measures I have found.
They are not intended primarily for theorem-proving but for use in the
analysis of actual modern markets. Two remarks about such applications
thus seem in order. (I hope to have more to report in the reasonably
near future.)
III
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First, symmetric structures like (2.8) or (2.8') are much easirer
to write down and estimate than nonsymmetric structures of any generality.
It would thus seem sensible in most applications to test for deviations
from symmetry before attempting to estimate a general matrix of kij.
One can base such tests on arguments that under the null hypothesis
of symmetry, the cross-equation disturbance covariance matrix from a
properly-specified system of estimated share equations should reflect
the underlying symmetry in testable ways.
Second, closely related problems are posed by the existence of
marketing instruments besides advertising and by firms selling multiple
brands in the same market. In some cases, the pattern of cross-effects
might be more or less invariant to the marketing instrument employed.
That is, if an increase in firms l's advertising would increase its
sales mainly at the expense of firm 2, it might also be that firm 2 would
be the main loser if firm 1 lowered price. In such cases, one could
estimate the kij separately for each important instrument of rivalry and
average them in almost any straightforward way. If rival firms belong to
different strategic groups, in the sense of Caves and Porter (1977) and
Porter (1979), these instrument-specific estimates might differ substan-
tially, however. An increase in advertising might affect rivals who
advertise a lot, while a cut in price might affect those who charge a
low price and advertise very little, for instance. In situations of
this sort, it is not immediately obvious how substantially different
sets of kij should be combined.
Similarly, if a firm sells multiple brands, it can take a variety
of different actions when attempting to increase its overall share. The
analysis above used "firm" and "brand" interchangeably, but in fact a
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single firm may sell several brands with very different patterns of
k... It is again not immediately obvious how these should be combined
if one wants a measure of concentration at the firm level, not the brand
level. It should be possible to devise an appropriate generalization of
H* by beginning with models like (2.8) in which firms sell multiple brands,
but have not yet attempted this.
3. Product Differentiation Advantages
Standard usage defines product differentiation by the consequences
of its absence: product differentiation is present whenever buyers do
not treat the wares of competing sellers .as perfect substitutes. It is
also standard to follow Bain (1956, p. 3) and evaluate barriers to entry
"... by the advantages of established sellers in an industry over potential
entrant sellers, those advantages being reflected in the extent to which
established sellers can persistently raise their prices above a competitive
level without attracting new firms to enter the industry. Adopting
these definitions, there is no obvious reason why these two dimensions of
market structure should be causally related or even correlated in cross-
section. Indeed, one can think of examples of markets with considerable
apparent differentiation in which entry barriers appear negligible
(restaurants) and in which they are at least arguably substantial (break-
fast cereals).2 0
In his seminal work on conditions of entry, Bain (1956, ch. 4)
observed that differentiation might in some instances translate into a
preference for established brands over new brands and that this sort of
product differentiation advantage could constitute a barrier to entry.
Bain found this source of entry barriers to be very important in some of
III
- 19 -
the markets he studied, and he sought (mainly through interviews) to
understand the nature and origins of the corresponding buyer preferences
in each case. Summarizing his work on product differentiation advantages,
Bain (1956, p. 143) concluded:
All of these things might seem to suggest the
existence of fundamental technical considerations,
institutional developments, and more or less funda-
mental consumer traits which make possible or even
very probable the development of strong and stable
product-preference patterns. They may also suggest
that advertising per se is not necessarily the main
or most important key to the product-differentiation
problem as it affects intra-industry competition and
the condition of entry. Although instances are found
in which it is, we may need in general to look past
advertising to other things to get to the heart of
the problem.
Despite this conclusion, most of the relevant cross-section econo-
metric work on the determinants of profitability has followed Comanor
and Wilson (1967) and used the ratio of advertising to sales as a proxy
variable for both the importance of product differentiation and the
significance of product differentiation advantages of established firms
over potential entrants. Most of these studies have found a strong positive
statistical relation between the advertising/sales ratio and various measures
of profitability across industries. This has most commonly been inter-
preted as reflecting advertising's ability to enhance and protect monop-
oly profits of established firms. Since the theoretical case for such a
causal relation between these variables is less than airtight, there
are measurement problems associated with the standard practice of expensing
advertising instead of capitalizing it, and the observed statistical
relation must reflect firms' advertising budgeting rules as well as
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advertising's effect on market structure, the interpretation of the
21
cross-section econometric results has been hotly debated. Whatever
the eventual outcome of that debate, these results cannot by their
nature refute Bain's conclusion that advertising may not be "the main
or most important key" to understanding the relation between product
differentiation and conditions of entry, since advertising has generally
been the only differentiation-related variable considered in cross-
section econometric work.
Bain (1956, ch. 4) does not explicitly assert the nature of this
"key", but a number of his remarks suggest that he thinks that buyer
uncertainty about product quality is at the heart of the mechanism in-
volved. Thus he notes early in his discussion (p. 116), "There is a.
good a priori possibility, moreover, that most buyers will on balance
prefer established and known products to new and unknown ones." Similarly,
he states (p. 130) that within his sample, "the allegiance of consumers
to established products in areas in which they are ignorant or uncertain
concerning the actual properties of products is quite important." Finally,
in summarizing (p. 142) the most common "strategic underlying considerations
in strong product differentiation," he begins with "durability and complexity
of the product (and corresponding infrequency of purchase by the individual
consumer), generally associated with poor consumer knowledge or ability
to appraise products, and thus with dependence on 'product reputation',
and also with dependence on customer-service organizations." All of this
suggests that established firms' advantages in differentiated markets might
often depend heavily on buyers' uncertainty about the attributes of new
brands, so that being first in a market might often be much more important
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than merely spending a lot of money on advertising. 2
Conventional wisdom in marketing and scattered recent empirical
work both support the notion that there are important advantages of
being the first entrant in some sorts of markets. Runyon (1977, p. 214)
states the conventional wisdom clearly: "If the product is virtually
identical with [established] competitive products, it has little chance
of marketing success. "23 Bond and Lean (1977, 1979) find that important
and long-lived advantages are enjoyed by pioneering brands of prescription
drugs, advantages that can only be overcome by late entrants if they offer
distinct therapeutic benefits. Whittin's (1979) study of cigarette
market segments points in this same direction, as does the cross-section
analysis of marketing costs by Buzzell and Farris (1976). Urban, Johnson,
and Brudnick (1979) use pre-test market analyses of buyer preferences
to adjust for quality differences between first brands and later entrants.
Based on data for 42 products in 16 consumer goods markets, they conclude
that the second brand on average attains less than 60% of the first brand's
share, the third brand obtains less than 40%, and so on. The problems faced
by an actual entrant into the U.S. reconstituted lemon juice industry
[Schmalensee (1979)] are at least consistent with this sort of disadvantage.
Finally, experiments reported in the marketing literature by Tucker (1964),
McConnell (1968) and others reveal that consumers are willing to pay a
premium to continue purchasing brands with which they have acquired
experience, even when all "brands" are identical in appearance and in fact.
A simple model involving rational buyer behavior serves to support the
idea that product differentiation advantages can be built on differential
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information and to shed some light on the mechanism that might be in-
24
volved. Consider a narrowly-defined product class, like bottled lemon
juice, such that individual consumers can be sensibly modeled as using
at most one brand in the class at a time. It is assumed that brands
either "work" or "don't work"; they either perform as a brand in this
class should, or they fail to perform acceptably. Whenever a new brand
is introduced, all consumers are naturally uncertain about whether or not
it will work. Assume that we have what Nelson (1970) christened "experience
goods": the only way a consumer can resolve this uncertainty is to buy a
brand and try it. One trial suffices to determine whether or not any
brand works.
Let the function F(v), 0 < v V give the number of consumers willing
to pay at least v for a unit of a brand in this class that works. Suppose
that prior to the introduction of the first brand, all consumers have
subjective probability that it will not work, and all value a unit that
doesn't work at (-~v), with > 0. (One might have P > 0 for a bleach
that could ruin clothes, for instance.) Suppose that the time between
purchases is constant, call it one period, and let the corresponding one-
period discount rate, assumed common to all consumers, be r. Given market
interest rates, more frequent purchase implies a smaller value of r.
,,
The assumption that all consumers have the same values of , , and r is
not as restrictive as it might seem, since the development below can be
interpreted as applying only to a subset of consumers with the same values
of these parameters, and the demand functions obtained can then be summed
across all such subsets.
III
To simplify the analysis, let us assume that the prices of individual
brands must be held constant over time. In Schmalensee (1980b) it is
shown that the main conclusions developed below go through if price
changes are allowed, but the details of the argument are too space-
consuming for inclusion here. Let us also assume that consumers are risk-
neutral, have infinite horizons, and behave perfectly rationally. Risk-
neutrality and infinite longevity merely simplify, while perfect rationality
could perhaps even be defended to a non-economist in this context by noting
that the consumer's decision problem is relatively straightforward. 2 5
The solution to that problem is the heart of the model. Suppose
that in order to try a new brand, a consumer ceases (for one period) to
use a substitute that yields a non-negative surplus (demand price minus
purchase price) of s. Then it is rational to try a new brand selling at
price p if and only if the following inequality is satisfied:
i(-4v-p) + (s/r)] + (-T) [(v-p)(l+r)/r] > s(l+r)/r (3.1)
The first bracketed term on the left gives discounted surplus if the new
brand is tried, doesn't work, and the consumer switches back to the substitute.
(It is assumed that one must use the entire unit of the new brand in order
to evaluate it, so that its failure to work does not trigger early purchase
of the substitute. This is not crucial to the argument.) Since the new
brand need not be chosen once and for all, the consumer is willing to pay
more than the expected gain vis a vis the substitute to try it. The
second term on the left of (3.1) capitalizes the stream of surplus associated
with a brand that works, and the term on -the right gives the benefit
associated with continuing to purchase the substitute.
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Inequality (3.1) can be re-written as
p < (v -- s) -Tv, (3.2)
where the quantity T i defined by
T = r(l+4)/(1+-r-a). (3.3)
This quantity captures the premium that must be paid to induce trial. If
T = 0, condition (3.2) indicates that the new brand will be purchased if and
only if its net surplus, v - p, exceeds s. As one would expect, T is in-
creasing in and I. It is also increasing in r. Larger values of r
reflect lower purchase frequency, this serves to increase the importance
of any single purchase relative to the entire future stream of purchases,
and this makes the risk associated with trying the new brand. loom larger
relative to the alternative of sticking with the substitute. As noted
above, Bain (1956, p. 142) attaches some importance to low purchase frequency
in this context.
For the first brand in some particular product class, it is reason-
able to take s = 0. Without loss of generality, we can set the marginal
utility of income for every consumer to unity. This means that before the
appearance of the product category, every consumer receives zero surplus
(on the definition used here) from the marginal unit of every commodity pur-
chased. (We are assuming away indivisibilities.) If only a small fraction
of total spending is devoted to the substitute product relevant here, so that
income effects can be neglected, it follows that the foregone surplus from
reducing spending on the substitute is zero-. Alternatively, one can construct
II
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a mechanical (and somewhat strained) normalization argument for
setting s = 0.
If the first brand is priced at P1 and announced to consumers who
have s=O, it follows immediately from (3.2) that it will be tried by those
with
v > pl/(l-T). (3.4)
If we suppose for simplicity that the first brand in fact always works,
then all who try it stick with it, and its demand function is given by
ql = F[Pl/(l-T)]. (3.5)
Note that the assumption that a brand always works is perfectly consistent
with consumers' ex ante uncertainty about its quality. Pre-trial advertising
may be able to convey a great deal of product information, but as Nelson
(1974) has noted, sophisticated consumers must be skeptical about quality
26
assertions that they can directly verify only after purchase. If one sets
V = 1 by choice of units and if F(v) = 1-v for 0 < v < 1, so that consumers'
valuations are uniformly distributed over the unit interval, equation (3.5)
becomes
0 < Pl < 1 - . (3.6)
Now suppose a second brand appears that is objectively identical to
the first. Again, consumers know that it is worth v if it works and (-4v)
if it doesn't. Even though the second brand is assumed always to work, it
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is again reasonable for imperfectly informed consumers to attach some
probability to its not working. If consumers do not talk to each other
about this product class, as has been in effect assumed so far, those who
did not try brand one have no reason to assign any value but 71 to the
probability that brand two doesn't work. Those who have tried brand one
and found it to work might assign a somewhat lower probability to brand
two's not working, since they know that it is at least possible to produce
a brand in this class that works. For algebraic simplicity, I assume
instead that they also have subjective probability X that brand two does
not work. It is shown below that greater optimism on the part of this
group improves brand two's prospects in a continuous fashion. (That is,
group members do not all rush to buy brand two if they are only a little
bit more optimistic about its chances of working.)
The second brand's sales of course depend on the first brand's price.
In order to highlight the problem of late entry, suppose that the first
brand does not alter its price in response to new competition. This is a
much more passive response than any considered in the recent literature on
entry deterrence cited in Section 1, above. Empirically, it is easy to
find cases in which price is reduced in response to attempted entry; see
Schmalensee (1979) for an example. Further, unless one assumes that
collusion is without cost or difficulty, successful entry that transforms
a market from monopoly to duopoly must lower at least the expected value
of price under any reasonable model of firm behavior. The assumption that
P1 will be held ccnstant under all circumstances is thus surely the most
optimistic assumption a potential entrant could plausibly hold.
Under this assumption, suppose that brand two enters and sets its
II
- 27 -
price, P2, equal to Pl. Those consumers who did not find it optimal
to try brand one then find it optimal not to try brand two either. If
P2 were slightly below Pl, a small number of this group would be induced
to try brand two and, since brand two always works, they would stay with
it indefinitely. Those consumers who did try brand one are now enjoying
a surplus of (v - pl) on each purchase occasion. For any such person to
try brand two would mean giving up this positive quantity, while trying
brand one involved giving up a zero suprlus. It is easy to see that nobody
currently buying brand one will rationally try brand two unless it is
discretely cheaper, since otherwise there is no point to bearing the risk
of trial. Thus if brand two enters with a price equal to brand one's, it
will sell nothing at all, and if it uncercuts brand one a tiny bit, it will
have correspondingly tiny sales. The demand conditions facing brand two
are not the same as those that faced brand one, because some consumers have
made irreversible investments in learning about brand one. In order to do
persuade them to make the same sort of investment in learning about brand
two, that brand must offer some advantage over brand one. The only way to do
that here is to charge a lower price.
In general, using (3.2) and (3.4), brand two is tried and used by
non-users of brand one for whom
P2 < (-T)v and v < p1(l-T), (3.7a)
and it is tried and used thereafter by customers of brand one for whom
and v > p/(l-T).P2 < P1 - TV (3.7b)
III
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Note that consumers with large values of v are least likely to try brand
two, even though they were most likely to try brand one. This switch occurs
because their high valuation of brand one gives them a high opportunity cost
of trying brand two once they've learned that brand one works.
Conditions (3.7) are depicted in Figure 1. Before brand two's
entry, brand one has sales of F[pl/(l-T)], from (3.5). Upon entry, brand
two is tried by those consumers with v's located between the intersections
of the p = P2 line and the solid kinked schedule. As the Figure is drawn,
brand two has sales of {F[P2/(1-T)] - F[F(P1-P 2)T]}, so that brand one has
lost sales of {F[pl/l-T)] - F[(pl-P2)/T] }. Note that from (3.7b), brand
two does not capture any of brand one's customers unless P2 < pl( 1-2T)/(1 -T).
If experience with brand one causes consumers to be more optimistic
about brand two, the first inequality in (3.7b) would involve some parameter
T' less than T in place of T. In terms of Figure 1, this would mean re-
placing the (p = pl-Tv) locus with a flatter line having the same intercept
and slope (-T'). Small changes in T' would then clearly give rise to small
changes in brand two's prospects, as asserted above. As long as T' is
positive, brand two must charge a discrete amount less than brand one in
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order to capture any of the latter's customers.
As they stand, conditions (3.7) imply the following demand function
for brand two:
q2 = F[p2/(1-T)] - F[pl/(l-T)], (1-2T) p1/(I-T) p2 P
(3.8a)
2 F[P2 /(-T)] - F[(pl-P2)T], p1-TV <P'2 < (1-2T)P1/(-T),
(3.8b)
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q2 = F[P2/(]-T p2 p1)]' TV. (3.8c)
Only if P2 is low enough to induce all of brand one's customers, along with
some non-users, to invest in trial does brand two face the same demand curve
as brand one did. Otherwise, brand two's demand curve is below brand one's,
no matter what price brand one changes.
In order to show this idfference, the demand function (3.8) is graphed
in Figure 2 under the uniformity assumptions that gave rise to (3.6). The
right-most dotted line is (3.6), the demand function that initially faced
brand one. Since brand two can make positive sales if it undercuts brand
one by a tiny amount, its entry cannot be deterred under our assumptions if
unit costs are constant and brand one is generating excess profit. It there
are economies of scale, however, so that the long-run average cost curve
looks like the curve labeled AC in Figure 2, brand one can enjoy excess
profits and not worry about entry. In general, if pre-entry excess profits
are possible for brand one and if there are any scale economies, the geometry
of Figure 2 makes it clear that there is a barrier to entry in Bain's sense
after brand one is established. This holds a fortiori' if potential entrants
are less optimistic than assumed here.
A number of comments about this barrier are in order. First, the
second brand's handicap vanishes if T = 0 and, roughly, increases with
T. Since T increases with ~c and , which measure the risk of trying a
new brand, and with r, which varies inversely with purchase frequency, this
model is broadly consistent with Bain's observations about risk and purchase
frequency quoted above. Second, in this model consumers acquire information
about new brands only by trying them or, perhaps, by exposure to advertising
III
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that is not fully credible. If information about new brands is valuable
enough, however, one can expect consumers to use word-of-mouth and other
channels to seek it. In this model, it is easy to show that if the
expected value of perfect information about a new brand is positive,
multiplying p, s, and v by any positive scalar k also multiplies that
value by k. This means that information is worth more for products with
a higher unit value, all else equal. This in turn suggests that the
barrier modeled here may be most important, all else equal, for low-priced
products, since consumer information-seeking may be least important there.
Third, it is interesting to note that a barrier to entry arises in this
framework only through the interaction of ate entrants' demand dis-
advantage and brand-specific scale economies. Bain (1956, ch. 4) was
concerned about economies of scale in marketing in this context, but the
present analysis implies that scale economies in production are also
relevant. Fourth, it is worth noting explicitly that advertising plays
no role in creating the entry barrier modeled here. This does not prove
that advertising never creates product differentiation advantages that
established sellers can use to protect monopoly profits from entry. It
does suggest, at least, that Bain's (1956, p. 143) finding that "advertising
per se is not necessarily the main or most important key to the product-
differentiation problem" deserves to be taken more seriously than it
generally has been.
The model of this section is consistent with marketers' conventional
wisdom that so-called "me-too" brands, brands that promise quality identical
to established brands but sell. at lower prices, are unlikely to be very
successful in a set of consumer markets. This lends some theoretical
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respectability to the apparent fact that economists' most commonly-
assumed form of market rivalry, price-cutting with no quality change, is
very rare in some such markets. In situations where the model developed
here captures important aspects of market operation, the most natural and
common form of rivalry must involve developing products that differ from
existing ones, so that one's wares look like brand one, not brand two.
Models of market interaction that focus on price may be utterly misleading
in these cases, even when there are no technical obstacles to duplicating
rivals' products.
In the model considered here, all parties are rational. Brand one's
advantage does not arise because its customers are lazy or stupid or be-
cause they are easily misled by advertising. This might lead one to
suspect that an equilibrium in which brand one earns excess profits in
perpetuity can have some sort of optimality properties. In fact, the
brand one's of this world have taken risks and been innovative. I see
nothing in this framework that might link the size of the rewards from
early entry to the social value of the corresponding innovation, however.
The dependence of the barrier's height on the importance of scale economies
makes it especially doubtful that this kind of permanent monopoly situation
has any particularly attractive optimality properties. On the other hand,
it is not obvious what sort of public policy would reliably enhance
efficiency, since consumers are generally rational to worry about the
quality of products with which they lack experience. More work is needed,
as usual.
4. Advertising and Consumer Behavior
When they participate as buyers in modern markets, consumers often
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make purchase decisions under uncertainty about complex products. In
many modern markets, sellers spend a substantial fraction of their revenue
on advertising, attempting to affect those decisions. In such cases, it is
reasonable to assume that on average, advertising spending has some impact.
on firm or brand sales. A deeper set of issues involve the effect of these
expenditures on market structure. Hypotheses about these latter effects
must be based on explicit or implicit hypotheses about consumer behavior,
since these effects must derive from shifts in the structure of consumer
demand. I hope to show in this concluding Section that widespread failure
to recognize the implications of this straightforward observation and un-
willingness to grapple with the rich detail of market operation has limited
economists' understanding of advertising and thus impaired our ability to
analyze modern markets.
In mainstream economic theory, households are almost always assumed
tc solve dynamic optimization problems under uncertainty correctly, no
matter how hard the solutions are to characterize or compute. If the
problem involved is relatively straightforward, as in the previous Section
or in Butters' (1977) interesting model of informative advertising, this
may be empirically plausible. When consumers must solve complex dynamic
programming problems correctly in order to behave rationally, however,
most non-economists and even some economists would doubt the value of
imposing perfect rationality. This does not imply that rational behavior
models cannot yield useful insights in complex situations, only that it
may be misleading to take such models too seriously. One might, for
instance, be willing to accept as a plausible hypothesis the prediction
of Grossman, Kihlstrom, and Mirman (1977) that if larger purchases yield
more useful information about product quality in a dynamic context,
III
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consumers will buy more than they would if information had no value,
without having much faith in the ability of their complex optimization
model to make correct quantitative or detailed predictions about behavior.
Those who have taught introductory statistics or have been persuaded by
the experimental evidence reported by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and
others might suspect that consumer behavior could deviate systematically
from optimality even in simple situations involving uncertainty. In any
case, one cannot appeal to natural selection and talk about as if
optimization for households as is commonly done for competitive firms.2 8
I am not trying to argue that it is wrong in any sense to make the assumption
that consumers behave optimally at all times, just to suggest that this
assumption lacks obvious empirical plausibility when real households are
assumed to solve problems that economic theorists themselves find difficult
to analyze.
Most discussions of advertising in industrial organization run no risk
at all of taking the rationality assumption too seriously. Consumers are
generally treated as responding more or less mechanically to advertising
spending, not as intelligent agents consciously deciding how to react to
the advertising they encounter. Sometimes, as in the work of Dixit and
Norman (1979), it is explicitly assumed that advertising spending changes
tastes in a predictable way, but it is more common to be less formal and
less explicit about how consumers are being manipulated.29 Again, I am
not trying to argue that this view of consumer behavior is always wrong. But
I would agree with its "Chicago School" critics that it misses important
aspects of at least some situations.30 Advertising sometimes does provide
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information that clearly improves consumer decisions, if only by making
them aware that new products exist. It seems odd to assert that consumers'
tastes are changed by want ads or grocery store ads that stress price
information, for instance. When the rational response to some particular
advertisment or other market event is obvious to most economists, it seems
a bit unreasonable to assume that most consumers will respond very differently.
Economists have generally left the detailed study of actual consumer
decision-making to psychologists and marketers. In the marketing literature,
especially, one encounters descriptions of consumer behavior intermediate
between the two extremes just discussed. Consumers are treated as boundedly
31
rational,in Herbert Simon's phrase. They are assumed to pursue reasonably
stable objectives in a reasonably intelligent fashion, but not necessarily
in the supremely rational fashion economists reflexively assume. As humans,
consumers' effectiveness is sometimes limited by their finite abilities to
receive, store, retrieve, and process information. Given their limits, they
sometimes sensibly adopt rules of thumb to economize on decision-making time.
Both introspection and considerable empirical work support this general
32
view.
Williamson (1975, 1979) has emphasized the importance of recognizing
bounded rationality in the study of institutional and contractual structure.
He argues that it becomes important to economize on human rationality when
complex uncertainty is an important feature of the relevant environment.
Contracts and institutions can be expected to reflect this. In simple
situations, where uncertainty is either of minor importance or easy to
describe, one loses little by ignoring the boundedness of rationality. On
very similar reasoning, one might expect the bounds on consumer rationality
III
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to be of negligible importance in some market situations, while in others
they might be the prime determinants of observed behavior. Thus if
optimization is possible for reasonably intelligent people, optimal
behavior is probably a good prediction. But if consumers face a problem
for which the exact solution is either difficult or impossible to compute,
it might be important to know what sort of heuristics and rules of thumb
humans tend to employ in related contexts if one wishes to predict actual
behavior. The non-economic literature on consumer behavior thus suggests
strongly that the most appropriate shorthand description of consumer
behavior in general, and of consumer reaction to advertising in particular,
might depend crucially on the details of the decision problem posed for
consumers by the market considered.
This in turn suggests that the effects of advertising on market
structure and competition can be expected to vary considerably, depending
on both the initial market situation and the nature of the advertising
involved. There is some empirical support for this hypothesis in the
industrial organization literature. Benham (1972), for instance, finds
that restrictions on eyeglass sellers' advertising tend to raise the price
of eyeglasses, while Scherer (1980, pp. 380-3) documents the extraordinary
price premia commanded by heavily nationally advertised brands in some
markets. Boyer (1974) finds advertising intensity to be negatively
associated with profitability in a sample of trade and service industries.
Porter (1974) finds no association between advertising and profitability
across markets in which retailers serve as an important source of consumer
information. He finds a strong positive association in a sample of what
he calls "convenience goods", which are usually purchased without consulting
- 38 -
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a retailer. In later work, Porter (1976) finds suggestions that
different media have different competitive effects. Finally, Lambin's
(1976) detailed econometric analysis of sixteen product classes in eight
European countries supports the general impression of diversity.
Almost all the substantial literature recently surveyed by Comanor
and Wilson (1979) is concerned with chosing between two simple generalizations:
advertising is always pro-competitive, or advertising is always anti-
competitive. If the nature of advertising and of consumer response to it
varies across markets in response to more fundamental market attributes
as the discussion above implies, both of these are almost surely wrong.
Adequate analysis of the role of advertising in any individual modern
market likely requires the development or deployment of a model reflecting
the key features of that market. In many models that prove useful for
market analysis, consumers may be assumed supremely rational as a good
approximation. In at least some situations, however, it may be necessary
to deal explicitly with bounds on consumer rationality in order to explain
observed behavior adequately. Sufficient analysis of actual modern markets,
using the modern theoretical and econometric tools of the new industrial
organization, can be expected to teach us something about the conditions
under which various forms of advertising have desirable or undesirable
effects on market structure and operation.
III
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FOOTNOTES
1. Grether (1970) and Weiss (1971) discuss this early history. Mason
(1939) is still worth reading on problems and methods.
2. Weiss (1971, p. 362). This history doesn't describe the evolution of
the Chicago School very well. Perhaps because of its early resistance
to the Chamberlinian revoluti.on in microeconomic theory, Chicago seems
never to have lost faith in the ability of Marshallian price theory to
explain the central features of observed market behavior. For whatever
reason, formal theory is much more important and generalizations from
cross-section evidence are much less important in Stigler (1968) than
in Bain (1968).
3. For instance, most early cross-section studies find a positive correlation
between concentration and profitability and interpret it as reflecting a
positive causal relation between concentration and ease of collusion. In
an important revisionist study, Peltzman (1977) argues that this correlation
in fact mainly reflects a positive relation between cost-reducing in-
novative activity and increases in concentration. That is, Peltzman
argues that profits are high mainly where costs of infra-marginal in-
novative firms with large market shares are relatively low. Careful
readers of his study will come to appreciate the difficulty of using
available data to discriminate among alternative models of these sorts.
4. Spence (1980, p. 11). Schmalensee (1979) takes a similar methodological
position.
5. See also Salop (1979b), Eaton and Lipsey (1980), and Schmalensee (1980a).
Scherer (1980, ch. 8) provides a good discussion of the limit-pricing
model and its critics. Very recent work by Kreps and Wilson (1980) and
others they cite seems likely to deepen our understanding of predatory
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pricing and other strategic responses to entry.
6. In general terms, Bain (1968, ch. 5) and Stigler (1968, pp. 29-36)
agree on this point. Demsetz (1973) apparently does not join them.
7. Hannah and Kay (1977, ch. 4) provide a useful discussion of functions
that have been employed to define and measure concentration; see also
Scherer (1980, pp. 56-59) and the references he cites.
8. It is generally but not universally accepted that market concentration
is of interest mainly for its predictive value. Dansby and Willig (1979)
propose concentration measures that reflect the returns from government
intervention under certain assumptions about the costs thereof, while
Blackorby, Donaldson, and Weymark (1979) argue that concentration measures
should be derived as part of a market performance index concerned directly
with unequal firm shares.
9. Hannah and Kay (1977, pp. 11-12) have this same derivation. For other
exzmples of the sort of approach taken here, see Dansby and Willig (1979)
and Encaoua and Jacquemin (1980).
10. In retrospect, at least, some of Sraffa's (1926, pp. 182-197) language,
which is cited approvingly by Hotelling (1929), is very suggestive of the
spatial model.
11. Parsons and Schultz (1976, ch. 7) provide a useful survey.
12. Discussions of alternative techniques and lists of references are provided
by Hauser and Koppelman (1979) and Huber and Holbrook (1979). Clarke
(1978) has explored the use of perceptual mapping data in econometric work.
13. Urban, Johnson, and Brudnick (1979) discuss the literature on the first of
these approaches and present the second technique in detail.
14. Bernhardt and Mackensie (1968) propose a rather different approach to this
problem of structural measurement.
- 50 -
15. Bell, Keeney, and Little (1975) and Barnett (1976) present axiomatic
derivations of this basic functional form. Models of this sort are
analyzed in detail in Schmalensee (1976a, 1976b).
16. This is not the most natural spatial model of non-price competition.
In the standard one-dimensional spatial model of price competition,
each firm has only one rival for each half its market; see Salop
(1979a) for a good discussion. Such a framework is a bit harder to
work with here, however, and its use would not add much insight. Hannah
and Kay (1977, pp. 12-15) have an interesting analysis of price-setting
in the standard model from which a multiple of the H index of concentration
emerges,much as it does below.
17. Models of this sort and more general implications of related curvature
properties are explored in Schmalensee (1976b, 1977b, 1978a).
18. If one is very lucky about the distribution of the ai in some historical
sample, for instance, one might be able to obtain useable estimates of
the relative magnitudes of these cross-derivatives from ordinary linear
regression, even though the underlying structure must be nonlinear.
Wrnite (1980) provides a very careful analysis of this approach.
19. Both Fisher (1979) and von Weiszacker (19-79) would apprently call such
an advantage an entry barrier only if it would be socially preferable
to remove it. I prefer Bain's usage, mainly because I see little to
be gained from a forced merger of the difficult positive and normative
issues in this area.
20. An argument is given in Schmalensee (1978b).
21. That debate is surveyed by Comanor and Wilson (1979), Demsetz (1979),
and Scherer (1980, chs. 9 and 14). It is perhaps worth mentioning that
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the U.S. ready-to-eat breakfast cereal industry has generally had both
very heavy advertising relative to sales and very high measured profitability.
While entry of new firms has been rare, entry of new brands sold by established
firms has been quite common. Since most cereal advertising deals with the
attributes of individual brands, if consumer goods advertising generally
serves to inhibit new entry, it should have served to inhibit the intro-
duction of new brands of cereal. As it apparently did not do so, the meaning
of at least this one sample point in cross-section studies would seem to be
in doubt. [Schmalensee (1978b)]
22. Bain (1956, ch. 4) mentions a number of other factors, including economies
of scale in advertising and pre-emption of scarce retail outlets, that are
not directly addressed in the present analysis. On scale economies, see the
references cited in footnote 21 and Schmalensee (1980a).
e 23. Peckham (1966) makes essentially the same point.
24. This extends the model in the Appendix to Schmalensee (1979) and is a
special case of the model analyzed in Schmalensee (1980b). Bond and Lean
(1979) present a model that has the same sort of implications as the one in
the text, but they focus on advertising and do not treat consumers as
(necessarily) rational. A broadly similar set up is considered by von
Weizsacker (1979, ch. 5), but his model is basically competitive and the
one in the text is not.
25. The general status of the rationality assumption in this sort of context
is discussed briefly in Section 4, below.
26. On the limitations of Nelson's (1974) analysis, see Schmalensee (1978a) and
Boyer, Kihlstrom, and Laffont (1978). Note that after the first period, all
those buying the first brand are enjoying positive surplus. The first
brand could raise its price to pl/(l-T) and lose no sales. The consequences
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of allowing pricing of this sort, which is commonly observed in new
brand introduction, are explored in Schmalensee (1980b).
27. In Schmalensee (1980b), brand two is allowed to charge a low price
upon entry in order to induce trial and then to undercut brand one
by a tiny amount. Brand two's disadvantage is smaller, roughly
speaking, in this more complicated model, but it does not vanish.
28. Several of the points made here are developed more fully in
Schmalensee (1975).
29. Sees for instance, the discussions in Comanor and Wilson (1967, 1979),
Mann (1974), and Scherer(1980, ch. 14). Kotowitz and Mathewson
(1979b) develop a dynamic model of "persuasive" advertising, which is
assumed mechanically to alter consumers' perceptions. See also their
(1979a) model of "informative" advertising.
30. Telser (1964) provides an important early statement of this "advertising
is information" viewpoint; see also Brozen (1974), Ferguson (1974),
Nelson (1974), and Demsetz (1979).
31. Simon (1978) provides an excellent discussion of rationality in and
out of economics that is directly relevant here.
32. This view of consumer behavior is presented most explicitly by Bettman
(1979), who also surveys the relevant evidence. Other useful references
in this literature include Howard (1977), Runyon (1977), and Engle,
Blackwell, and Kollat (1978).
33. Howard (1977, p. 151) presents an interesting classification of
products similar in spirit but apparently more general than that used
by Porter (1974).
